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Deliberation of Controversial Public School Curriculum: Developing
Processes and Outcomes that Increase Legitimacy and Social Justice
Abstract

Public schools in the United States are charged with facilitating public deliberation of controversial school
curriculum. This often entails managing the negotiations between multiple stakeholders who have very
different positions on the proper design and implementation of curriculum. To maintain legitimacy as
caretakers of the public interest in a liberal democracy, public schools are asked to recognize all legitimate
perspectives in such disputes. But what happens when a perspective is not considered legitimate or in the
public interest by the dominant community? When disputes over curriculum ensue, the rights of individuals
to have their perspectives included in the curriculum must be considered in tandem with the public school’s
primary responsibility—to teach students to nurture a democracy. This essay synthesizes frameworks from
deliberative democracy theorists to better understand the ways that the process and outcome of public school
curriculum deliberation can increase in legitimacy and responsiveness to issues of social justice. To develop
and illustrate this theoretical framework, I examine the case of a small group of activists who challenged a
curriculum’s claim that the internment of Japanese Americans during WWII was clearly a mistake. Activist
wanted the curriculum to say that the internment was done out of military necessity. I conclude that
Gutmann’s guidelines of non-discrimination and non-repression must be synthesized with Habermas’s
guidelines for a proceduralist model of deliberation.
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Deliberations over controversial issues such as evolution, intelligent
design, sex education, multicultural education, school prayer, and history
illustrate the complexity of deciding how competing claims concerning the public
interest should be represented in the public school curriculum (Binder, 2000,
2002; Gutmann, 1995; Zimmerman, 2002). Pinar (2004) writes that “the school
curriculum communicates what we choose to remember about our past, what we
believe about the present, what we hope for the future” (p. 20). It is no wonder
that the public school curriculum is a source of contention. Curriculum
deliberation is often emotionally and intellectually charged as stakeholders
struggle over how and what students should learn to promote what stakeholders
believe to be the best representation of society’s past, present, and future. As
portrayed in the curriculum, this best representation is a claim about the public
interest. I define the public interest as those claims values, beliefs, and opinions
that are believed to be in the common good of a public. Deliberation of these
claims is central to public school curriculum disputes when stakeholders have
competing claims about the public interest.
In 2004, one such dispute ensued over a sixth grade curriculum in a small
community that I call Telford, which is located in the Northwestern United States.
In the following essay, I use this dispute as a case to examine some theoretical
orientations to deliberation over public school curriculum. The curriculum, which
I name Leaving Our Homes (LOH), taught that the WWII internment of Japanese
Americans was clearly a mistake, but a small group challenged this claim. I call
this small group the LOH challengers. The LOH challengers said that the
internment was done out of military necessity, and they wanted the LOH
curriculum to reflect this perspective. They claimed that the public school was
charged with deliberating the views of all community members when designing
and implementing curriculum. However, it is the official stance of the United
States government that the internment was a mistake. As custodians of public
schools in Telford, as well as the curriculum and the related public interest,
Telford School District (TSD) administrators were charged with mediating
competing views on the LOH curriculum. It was apparent from the beginning of
the contention that TSD administrators, teachers, and many community members
believed the matter of internment had been settled by the U.S. government and
not an issue that Hess (2009) describes as “open” to controversy. What can we
learn from the LOH case about the deliberation of controversial public school
curriculum?
This essay addresses this question by first examining the concept of the
public interest because schools are charged with negotiating the public interest,
which is expressed in the form of curriculum. Second, I present Habermas’s
(1996b) three normative models of democracy as theoretical lenses to interpret
different conceptions of the public interest. Third, I extend these lenses to
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consider proceduralist and substantive orientations toward public deliberation. For
the former, legitimacy of decisions is privileged in the decision-making process
whereas for the latter, legitimacy of a decision is privileged by decision’s
alignment with a predetermined ethical-political understanding. The substantive
model is aligned with a civic republican model because it relies heavily upon
dominant community views to gauge if the product of deliberation is in the public
interest.
The LOH dispute represents a clear tension between these orientations.
The curriculum challengers were appealing to a procedural model of legitimacy
by demanding that their voices be heard although the issue was considered by
many to be closed to/as controversy. However, the issue of the wrongfulness of
the internment was also substantive based upon the official policy of the U.S.
government because the government had decreed an ethical-political
understanding. This understanding was the result of deliberation during a
congressional inquiry into the matter of the WWII Japanese American internment.
To extend deliberative and democratic theory to the area of curriculum
controversies, I use Habermas’s proceduralist orientation and Gutmann’s
substantive orientation to analyze and interpret the LOH case. I conclude that in
the LOH case, the procedural model of public deliberation is more congruent
with legitimacy in democratic theory than the substantive model.
Deliberation of the Public School Curriculum
The Public Interest
Curriculum controversies often arise from a challenge to dominant claims
about the public interest as they are expressed in the curriculum. In content
analyses of curriculum materials teaching about controversial public issues,
Camicia (2007, 2009) illustrates how the curriculum and the range of choices
given to students during deliberation is indicative of dominant ideologies. Pinar
(2004) reconceptualizes curriculum as “a multifaceted process, involving not only
official policy, prescribed textbooks, standardized examinations, but as well the
‘complicated conversation’ of participants” (p. 19). This dynamic definition of
curriculum emphasizes the school as a site of contention over issues ranging from
the history curriculum (e.g. Al-Haj, 2005; Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1997; Parkes,
2007) to creationist/evolutionist curriculum (Binder, 2002) to sex education
(Zimmerman, 2002) to the following example of a battle over culture and religion
in the public school curriculum.
In the so called l’affaire foulard or scarf affair in France, female Muslim
students were forbidden from wearing a foulard (scarf) because school authorities
claimed that the foulard’s meaning was religious in nature. Schools claimed that a
policy mandating state neutrality on religion, named laicité, prohibited the girls
from wearing their foulards in schools. According to Benhabib (2002), “some
women resisted the state not to affirm their religious and sexual subordination as
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much as to assert a quasi-personal identity independent of the dominant French
culture” (p. 94). The issue can be framed as one involving women’s rights to
freedom of expression and religion rather than one of women’s oppression. This
example illustrates the difficulty in asserting a claim about the public interest
without structuring public conversations that are inclusive of nondominant
cultural claims and competing epistemologies.
The French government held a specific ethical-political self-understanding
that hindered the nondominant ethical-political understanding of the women in the
case. Under a procedural model of deliberation, the women’s perspective would
have been privileged during the process of deliberation. Under a substantive
model of deliberation, the French government’s dominant perspective would have
been privileged during the process of deliberation. In public school curriculum
disputes, this substantive model is often guided by the expertise of professional
educators. However, educators often perpetuate dominant perspectives at the
expense of nondominant perspectives. This can be problematic during the
deliberation of controversial public and cultural issues reflecting multiple
epistemologies.
Different perspectives pertaining to the public interest in cases such as the
l’affaire foulard and Leaving Our Homes (LOH) curriculum controversies can
cause seemingly intractable battles because stakeholders voice competing claims
concerning the public interest. This difficulty rests at the heart of the democratic
decision-making process However, it is sometimes difficult to agree upon what
opinions undermine or threaten these democratic principles. For example,
according to creationists, the teaching of evolution without mention of
creationism denies recognition of creationist students and infringes upon their
right to freedom of religion. For those against the teaching of creationism in
science classrooms, the teaching of creationism infringes upon the right of noncreationist students to participate in a science classroom free from a religious
viewpoint. Both of these outcomes seem undemocratic and against the public
interest depending upon a person’s cultural background and epistemological
stance. In this example, the expertise of educators and scientists has trumped the
ethical-political and religious understandings of creationists in defining the public
interest in this curriculum area.
In sum, when controversies erupt over public school curriculum, schools
must decide how to resolve conflicts in a manner aligned with the public interest.
Is it in the public interest to include perspectives in the curriculum that the
dominant community finds offensive or undemocratic? What rights do individuals
have to define the public interest? When should nondominant groups and
individuals defer to the authority of educators in curriculum issues? In the next
section, I begin to address these questions by discussing Habermas’s (1996b)
three normative models of democracy and each model’s interpretation of the
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public interest. The following models help structure my examination of
deliberation of the public interest in curriculum disputes.
Three Normative Models of Democracy
Democratic institutions such as public schools are bound by particular
procedures of deliberation, which are based upon democratic principles.
Habermas (1996b) describes three normative models of democracy: liberal, civic
republican, and procedural. He first describes the liberal theorists in the tradition
of John Locke as claiming that,
The democratic process accomplishes the task of programming the
government in the interest of society, where the government is represented
as an apparatus of public administration, and society as a marketstructured network of interactions among private individuals. Here politics
(in the sense of the citizens’ political will-formation [public opinion that is
developed though public discussion]) has the function of bundling
together and pushing private interests against a government apparatus
specializing in the administrative employment of political power for
collective goals. (p. 21)
Under the liberal model, the individual rights of citizens are expressed in a
negative sense—citizens are protected from the incursion of the state or other
citizens. Individual interest is valued in the sense that individuals are free to
pursue their particular visions of a good life as long as they do not infringe upon
the rights of other citizens. The modern focus of this approach is upon human
rights. Public interest is determined through the aggregation of individual
opinions in the form of administrative processes such as voting. The formation of
public opinion about the public interest is a matter of individual competition
influenced by the administrative power of the state. Habermas’s main concern
with the liberal view is that reason privileges private interest over the public
interest. In controversies over curriculum, this model might privilege, for
example, a public vote to decide on which curriculum option to choose.
Habermas (1996b) compares the liberal model with the civic republican
model, which places strong emphasis upon public interest as defined by a
community’s existing ethical-political self-understanding. The civic republican
approach is often based upon the writings of Jean-Jacque Rosseau. Rather than
focus upon the rights of individuals in society, Habermas describes the civic
republican model:
In addition to the hierarchical regulations of the state and the decentralized
regulations of the market, that is besides administrative power and
individual interests, solidarity and orientation to the common good appear
as a third source of social integration. In fact, this horizontal political willformation aimed at mutual understanding or communicatively achieved
consensus is even supposed to enjoy priority. (p.21)
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While the government is also valued as a protector of individual liberty, the civic
republican perspective stresses the development of consensus upon a claim of the
public interest. But the civic republican view privileges claims about the public
interest based upon a community’s ‘common’ ethical-political self-understanding.
Rather than focusing upon administrative functions, such as voting, to determine
the public interest, the public interest is obtained by adherence to a
communicative understanding of a common past, present, and future. This is
problematic in curriculum issues because it is this understanding that is in dispute.
A substantive view of deliberation would privilege the dominant ethical-political
self-understanding of the community. The public usually defers to professional
educators to define this understanding. Habermas’s (1996b) main concern with
the civic republican model is that it overburdens and restricts political discourse
with an emphasis upon ethical consensus, a consensus that might not exist but is
assumed by those in positions of dominance to exist. Dominant claims of the
public interest often flourish at the expense of nondominant interpretations.
To illustrate the difference between liberal and civic republican models, I
return to the example of l’affaire foulard. School officials made claims about the
public interest by referring to the community norms of state neutrality in religious
affairs and enlightenment principles of religious freedom. This is where the line
between liberal and civic republican models becomes blurred. On the one hand,
the policy of neutrality is based upon the rights of all students to be free from
religious symbols in schools. The school also viewed the practice of veiling as
discriminatory to women. These reasons are strongly upheld by liberal views
concerning individual rights. On the other hand, in concurrence with the civic
republican model of democracy, the school claimed that the girls’ wearing of
foulards countered France’s ethical self-understanding. The school’s normative
assumption was that the law prohibiting religious symbols in schools rests in the
communicatively reached self-understanding of their national community.
In an attempt to negotiate the differences between the liberal and civic
republican normative models, Habermas (1996a, 1996b) describes the procedural
normative model of democracy as the basis of understanding the public’s interest
in such disputes. But before moving on to a comparison of the procedural model
with the liberal and civic republican normative models of democracy, I will take a
detour into Habermas’s (1984, 1987, 1992) concept of validity for three reasons.
First, a claim to know the truth has been long discredited by philosophers of
science. The concept of validity better expresses the contingent nature of what can
be known. What is commonly referred to as a claim to truth is in actuality a claim
to validity. Second, the nature and function of validity claims clarify comparisons
of his three normative models of democracy. Third, I will use Habermas’s three
normative models in conjunction with his concept of validity in my comparison
between Habermas and Gutmann in the next section.
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Habermas refines the concept of validity to be justified by underlying
structures of intersubjectivity found in communication. A claim gains validity
when it is tied to intersubjectivity. By tying validity claims to language, it follows
that validity claims are contingent upon social constructs of meaning and
intersubjective consensus rather than a claim to universal knowledge or truth.
Intersubjectivity and its relation to moral, ethical, and political meaning are the
vortex around which all of Habermas’s ideas revolve.
In the liberal view, validity claims concerning the public interest are
supported by an aggregate of strategic actors, all possessing rights protected by
the state. Public reasoning is not an integral part of public opinion formation
because in strategic communication, reasoning assumes an instrumental function
and not a communicative function. In contrast, within the civic republican view,
validity claims concerning the public interest are contained in the formation of an
ethical consensus. Validity is reliant upon a communitarian understanding of the
formation of public opinion. Reasoning assumes a function within the confines of
a community’s established ethical-political self-understanding. Thus, liberal and
communitarian models ground claims concerning the public interest in the
individual or community. For example, a claim about the public interest must be
valid because the majority has voted (liberal norm), or a claim about public
interest must be valid because there is a pre-existing ethical consensus (civic
republican norm).
In contrast, the procedural model places the formation of public opinion
within processes that are consistent with democratic principles of inclusion from
both nondominant and dominant claims concerning the public interest. The
negotiation of competing validity claims concerning the public interest in the
procedural model is based upon the democratic principle that “only those statutes
may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in
a discursive process of legislation” (Habermas, 1996a, p. 110). In this discursive
process, the validity of a claim concerning public interest is strengthened by
expanding ethical discourse to include multiple ethical perspectives while
remaining committed to the value of public reason in the formation of public
opinion. Habermas (1996b) writes:
The deliberative mode of legislative practice is not intended to ensure the
ethical validity of legal norms as the claim. One can understand the
complex validity claim of legal norms as the claim, on the one hand, to
compromise of competing interests in a manner compatible with the
common good and, on the other hand, to bring universalistic principles of
justice into the horizon of the specific form of life in a particular
community. (p. 25)
The procedural model represents a culmination of Habermas’s work by placing
law as the medium between the fact that there are multiple cultures or lifeworlds
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in a single society and the norms of a liberal democratic community that is “a
voluntary association of free and equal consociates under law” (Habermas, 1996a,
p. 111). Habermas (1996b) sums up the emergence of a definition of the public
interest in the procedural model:
According to this proceduralist view, practical reason withdraws from
universal human rights, or from the concrete ethical substance of a specific
community, into the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation. In the
final analysis, the normative content arises from the very structure of
communicative actions. These descriptions set the stage for different
conceptualizations of state and society. (p. 26)
Rather than focusing upon substantive outcomes such as human rights or a
community’s ethical self-understanding, Habermas rests a definition of the public
interest in the process that determines these ends. This focus upon process stems
from the realization that multicultural liberal democracies do not have a common
culture and epistemology in which to ground validity. Instead, individuals must
come together in a process that grounds validity in the process of communication.
Validity claims concerning the public interest are thus grounded in a democratic
process where all opinions are included in the process of forming public opinion.
Comparing Procedural and Substantive Approaches to Curriculum Controversy
Up to this point, I have discussed Habermas’s focus upon the process of
deciding the public interest. As the inclusion of the voices of those subject to
public decisions increases in the decision-making process, resulting claims
concerning the public interest gain validity. Procedures that promote an expansive
and inclusive public sphere will increase the validity of claims concerning
curriculum decisions emanating from that sphere (Camicia, 2007; 2009). This
provides the background for a comparison between how Habermas might propose
to settle curriculum controversies and the method that Gutmann (1987) proposes
in Democratic Education. There are two points that mark this comparison. First,
Gutmann limits deliberation by placing moral principles of nondiscrimination and
nonrepression at the front end of the deliberation process (see Figure 2). In Figure
1 and Figure 2, agreement is found between Habermas and Gutmann in the use of
‘ethical-political talk’ (what is right for a political community to do) and
procedurally regulated bargaining (rules of inclusion during talk).
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Figure 1: Habermas's procedural model of rational public interest-formation1

Figure 2: Gutmann’s model of deciding curriculum contentions
I locate Gutmann in Habermas’s description of the civic republican
normative model of democracy because of her quasi-foundational stance prior to
deliberation. In contrast to Gutmann’s restraint of deliberation, Habermas expands
the range of opinions discussed by placing moral discussion at the back end of his
deliberative model (see Figure 1). Second, in contrast to Habermas, who
emphasizes equity in the deliberation process, Gutmann privileges the
perspectives of educators.
Because democratic education is the central theme of her book,
Gutmann’s (1987) method of deliberation is constrained by a concern that
students develop and maintain the knowledge, skills, and dispositions necessary
for democratic governance. This means that deliberation must consist of “choices
among policies in accordance with those principles—of nonrepression and
nondiscrimination—that preserve the intellectual and social foundations of
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democratic deliberation” (p. 14). Gutmann places the principles of nonrepression
and nondiscrimination as the grounds for legitimacy. This has the effect of
narrowing deliberative options to predicted substantive outcomes based upon a
common understanding of nonrepression and nondiscrimination. These “moral”
principles exist prior to, during, and after deliberation.
Most deliberative democracy theorists require the principles of
nonrepression and nondiscrimination as standards for a legitimate process of
deliberation (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1989; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004;
Habermas, 1996a; Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, Amengual, & Gastil, 2006; Young,
2000). As I have already discussed, Habermas places the validity of public
interest claims primarily within the process of deliberation. This is a source of
disagreement and differentiation among deliberative theorists. Gutmann balances
public interest claims within the pre-process, the process, and the outcome of
deliberation. This extension of the requirements of public interest claims places
the extant moral self-understanding of the democratic community in a central
position of influence. This self-understanding governs the process of deliberation.
In combination, these characteristics of Gutmann’s orientation toward
deliberation situate her within the civic republican normative model of
democracy. While the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination are
liberal principles, the normative understanding of what these principles mean are
reliant upon a democratic community’s ethical-political self-understanding. This
self-understanding was central to l’affaire foulard. The policy of state neutrality
illustrated the manner in which apparent emancipatory values of nonrepression
are interpreted differently, making the claim of neutrality subject to an existing
self-understanding (Benhabib, 2002; Gutmann, 1995).
Gutmann (1987) illustrates the difference between a focus upon process
and a focus upon extant community beliefs as grounds for public interest claims
in her examination of the cases of book banning and the teaching of creationism.
In the case of book banning, Gutmann states:
Shifting our concern from the policy to the process, we would judge
various methods of textbook selection, first, by their openness to citizen
participation, and second, by their potential to open citizens to the merits
of unpopular points of view… It would lead us to prefer participatory
boards that took seriously the opinions of teachers and historians to those
that considered only the opinions of their constituents. (p. 101)
By balancing citizen opinions with expert opinions, the validity of public interest
claims would rest in the process of including all voices in deliberation while
balancing the need for education during this process. This is consistent with a
deliberative process that is guided by experts such as educators and historians.
This is a weak claim toward Gutmann’s orientation toward civic republicanism.
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Gutmann’s (1987) privileging of experts in the deliberation process is
stronger in her discussion of the teaching of creationism in public schools. She
claims that “the indirect—if not the direct—result of establishing religion in
public schools would be to restrict rational deliberation among competing ways of
life” (p.104). Gutmann provides an interesting dilemma here that demonstrates the
veto power of dominant extant moral and epistemological understandings in the
deliberation process. According to Gutmann, “the decisions concerning what
theories are taught in the classroom are a matter of professional, not democratic,
authority” (p. 101). Here she proposes to restrict public deliberation of curriculum
issues to guard against a future restriction of “rational deliberation among
competing ways of life” (p.104). Unfortunately, Gutmann presents a slippery
slope that equates the representation of religious views in the curriculum as an
establishment of religion. Whereas Habermas (1996a, 1996b) rests validity claims
concerning public interest within equity in the deliberation process, Gutmann
(1987) rests validity claims concerning public interest within the equity of
deliberation balanced against expert authority.
In the next section, I first present a narrative of the yearlong, Leaving Our
Homes (LOH) curriculum dispute. I conclude by analyzing and interpreting the
case with the theoretical framework presented up to this point. Both supporters
and challengers of the LOH curriculum felt that it was in the public interest to
have their interpretation and evaluation of the Japanese American internment
added to the curriculum. How did the school respond to their role as arbiters of
curriculum deliberation and the public interest?
The Leaving Our Homes Curriculum Controversy
Telford has the distinction of being the first community to be targeted by a
Civilian Exclusion Order demanding that Japanese Americans leave their homes.
All Japanese Americans in Telford were forced to leave their homes and farms.
Non-Japanese Americans in the community helped their Japanese American
neighbors pack, and during the internment period, non-Japanese Americans often
tended to animals, property, and farms. By most accounts, Telford community
members did whatever they could to lessen the blow of what they considered an
unjust and unnecessary action by the United States government. Presently in
Telford, there is a substantial memorial to the wrongfulness of the internment
located where Japanese Americans boarded mass transportation to the internment
camps. In addition, Japanese American culture is extremely strong in the
community. The Leaving Our Homes (LOH) curriculum was an extension of the
strong discourse within Telford that the internment of Japanese Americans was
wrong, and every child in the community should be taught as such. In other
words, most Telford residents had long held that it was in the public interest to
remember the internment as a mistake. It is within this context that LOH
challengers believed that it was in the public interest for students to learn a
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perspective that was less critical of the United States government, claiming that
there were military reasons for suspending the civil rights of citizens.
In January 2004, parents of what I call Hayashida Intermediate School
students received an email describing how the LOH curriculum was funded and
the learning objectives of the LOH curriculum. One parent responded to the email
with a letter questioning the school principal about the intent of the curriculum.
The same parent offered to give the principal of the school information
concerning Fort Telford, a local WWII military installation. She hoped that the
information would be added to the curriculum in an effort to provide the
perspective to the curriculum that the internment was done out of military
necessity. The principal described her response to the parent, “I responded and
said, ‘Thanks a lot. I’ll make sure that the teachers know about the historic
significance and that they can share that information as we teach this unit.’”
However, regarding other changes requested by the parent, such as including the
perspective that the internment was not a mistake, the principal refused to budge.
She sent a letter strongly stating that the internment was a mistake, and students
would continue to be taught as such.
Unsatisfied with the response of the school principal, two parents met with
the TSD official before the LOH curriculum was taught. The principal wrote a
letter to the parents in which she stated that the curriculum would be taught in its
original form. The parents then brought their complaint to the Telford School
District (TSD) superintendent. A meeting between the superintendent and the
parents took place in March. At the meeting, challengers raised concerns that the
curriculum took up too much instructional time, was biased, and contained factual
errors. As a result of the meeting, some common ground was forged, but again,
the internment would be taught as a mistake.
In April, the challengers wrote at least two letters to the Superintendent.
He responded in April stating that it would be in the best interest of the LOH
challengers to present their complaint to a public school board meeting in which
the curriculum would be reviewed. Challengers responded with a letter containing
detailed descriptions of the changes to the curriculum that they wanted to see
implemented.
The First Public Meeting
The first school board meeting in August 2004 was sparsely attended.
According to Brian, an LOH supporter, there were only two or three LOH
supporters in attendance, as well as school board members who supported the
curriculum. From the accounts of insiders and outsiders, no one expected the
controversy that erupted as a result of the first meeting. LOH challengers were
given extra time at the first meeting to present their concerns about the
curriculum. A challenger of the curriculum recalls the events:
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They asked for members of the public to speak, and I said I wanted to
speak, and they said, well, they’d give you three minutes. And I said,
“Well look, you told me three months ago that this was my opportunity to
speak. I want to speak to this issue.” And they said, “Okay.” So I read
my remarks and they were probably 15 minutes long and it was at that
point there must have been somebody there from the press.
In the first meeting, the developer of the LOH curriculum gave a brief
presentation including a DVD that included pictures of the development and
implementation of the LOH curriculum. LOH challengers were then given 15
minutes to present their disagreements with the curriculum. No one expected what
was in store for the second public meeting.
The Second Public Meeting
Over 100 people attended the second School Board meeting in September
2004. Of the 100 people in attendance, about 24 spoke, each for an allotted time
of three minutes. The majority of those speaking (about 19 of the 24) supported
the LOH curriculum. The LOH curriculum portion of the meeting lasted about an
hour and twenty minutes. Terra, a supporter of the curriculum, recalls the
procedure for the meeting:
When you walked in, you were asked to sign up if you wanted to speak
during the open period. And there was a huge - huge list. So the school
board meeting started, and they seemed a little bit surprised that so many
people had shown up. So they decided from the onset of the meeting to
have the open period at the beginning, addressed the curriculum issue, and
then move on to other items, and put those on the back burner of their
agenda so that everyone who wanted to speak could speak. With that said,
they asked people to cross their name off the list if they felt like what they
said would be redundant of other people and just make note of the fact that
they were there in support of the curriculum, or against the curriculum. So
some people did that.
Finally, an LOH challenger spoke about her experience at the second meeting:
I brought a four-page statement. I couldn’t speak. I was so upset and I
felt so outnumbered. And these - this was as you say, an angry crowd, a
rabid crowd and they all - nobody knows what we’re - why we’re
protesting the curriculum. They’re there to fight racism. And so I stood
up after the meeting with my four-page statement, and I took it up to [the
School Board President]. And I gave it to him, and I spoke to him for a
few minutes, and I begged him to read it, and I’m sure he didn’t. And I’m
sure no one else ever saw that statement.
Other LOH challengers said that they felt intimidated by the crowd and coerced
by the school board. In their view, this limited the ability of LOH challengers to
voice their claims about the curriculum, and as a result, the public interest.
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The Curriculum Revision Committee
After the second school board meeting, an LOH curriculum revision
committee was assigned to revise the curriculum. The committee was composed
of a cross-section of the community and educators. According to Emery, an LOH
challenger, “[One of the LOH challengers] attempted to be part of it, and they put
in random envelopes, and they just selected them. Well, what do you know? [the
LOH challenger] was not selected. I mean - you know, I was not born yesterday.”
Nance, a TSD official, facilitated the curriculum revision process and confirmed
that there was no attempt to include someone with an LOH challenger perspective
on the curriculum review committee. In the end, the curriculum revision
committee recommended that the LOH curriculum should be cut from 18 to 10
days of instructional time, but the claim that the internment was a mistake would
remain in the curriculum. In the committee’s view, the issue of the wrongfulness
of the internment had been settled by the U.S. government and it was closed to
letting students decide for themselves if the internment was a mistake or not.
Determining the Public Interest
In the narratives of both challengers and supporters of the Leaving Our
Homes (LOH) curriculum, it is apparent that educators, a Telford majority, and
Telford School District (TSD) had little intention of backing away from the claim
that the internment was anything other than a mistake. This is aligned with a civic
republican orientation because the dominant norms and beliefs of the community
overshadowed the concern that all voices be heard on the issue. As mentioned in
the beginning of the last section, there was a deeply held belief in Telford that the
internment was clearly wrong. Telford had developed an ethical-political
understanding of the internment. To many in Telford, the LOH challengers’ views
were illegitimate and against the public interest. With this consideration in mind,
the question becomes: How inclusive should the decision-making process of
public school curriculum be of perspectives that are abhorrent to the majority
community?
Under Gutmann’s (1987) model (see figure 2), the validity of a public
interest claim is based upon including all views in curriculum deliberation except
those that are discriminatory or repressive. The LOH supporters claimed that
adding the perspective that the Japanese American internment was not a mistake
was discriminatory and repressive. This was most evident in the frequent claims
by LOH supporters that the internment was caused by “race prejudice” (a
reference to the United States Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, 1997, p. 18). This belief was also evident in numerous
LOH supporter comparisons of LOH challenger views with issues such as the
Holocaust and slavery. Under Gutmann’s model, the LOH challengers should not
have had the opportunity to bring their view to the curriculum decision-making
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process. In other words, the moral judgment of the community precedes the
values of inclusion in the decision-making process (the civic republican model).
In contrast, Habermas’s (1996a, 1996b) procedural model privileges
inclusion in the initial phase of the decision-making process. The time for critical
awareness comes in the second phase of the process where stakeholders examine
ethical-political considerations of what is being included (see Figure 1). By
increasing inclusion of abhorrent or nondominant perspectives in the initial phases
of the decision-making process, the validity of claims of Telford School District
concerning the public interest would have increased. In other words, the decision
increases in validity, and the community is better able to gain critical awareness
of the way that power operates in public school curriculum decisions. In
Gutmann’s model, issues of power are concealed under an assumption of a
community’s normative understanding of non-oppression and non-discrimination.
This is highly ironic because in the process of assuming this normative
understanding, Gutmann increases the risk that hidden power relations will serve
to create conditions of oppression and discrimination.
Gutmann’s (1987) model best describes the LOH decision-making process
(in contrast with Habermas’s model (1996a, 1996b)). The initial meetings with
the Hayashida principal, the TSD official, and the TSD superintendent yielded the
only concessions that LOH challengers would ever receive in the decision-making
process. No concessions would be made during or after public school board
meetings. A TSD official said that the concessions made to LOH curriculum
challengers were decided before public meetings, assuming the school board
agreed with the concessions as outlined by the superintendent. This implies that
LOH challengers were only effective at getting concessions early in the decisionmaking process. Vikki described the concessions:
So there were some modifications that we agreed to make based on the
concerns that had been stated. But there wasn’t ever the intent to do away
with the curriculum nor were we basically changing a significant portion
of it; we were making some slight modifications to the curriculum.
Based upon a dominant understanding of the public interest, the school district
denied entry of the LOH challengers’ perspective of the internment as justified to
enter into the decision-making process. This is in agreement with Gutmann’s
model in which the range of choices in deliberation is limited to those that pass a
test of non-discrimination and non-repression. This standard is mainly decided by
educators who serve as arbiters of the process.
Under the lens of Habermas’s procedural model, the validity of the LOH
revision decision was reduced because LOH challengers were not given an
opportunity in public to give their statement free of coercion. Decisions made
under coercion decrease validity of claims because coercion translates to
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exclusion of claims about the public interest. As an LOH challenger described her
experience at the second public meeting,
I brought a four-page statement. I couldn’t speak. I was so upset and I
felt so outnumbered. As a result of the LOH decision-making process
between LOH challengers and supporters, the evidence and claims of
LOH challengers were never under any serious consideration in a public
forum.
Challengers were able to speak, but no one was listening. This is problematic
according to the procedural model because the claim to the public interest was
immune to challenges from non-dominant viewpoints. In the face of challenges
from non-dominant perspectives, the public interest has the opportunity to
strengthen its justifications or change in the face of new evidence presented by
challengers. In the next section, I suggest implications that this had for the
formation of public interest in the LOH contention.
Public Interest Formation in the LOH Contention
The procedures used in deciding curriculum controversies impact the way
that the public interest is interpreted by administrators and the community. LOH
challengers disputed the school district’s interpretation of Telford’s public
interest—an interpretation of what is best for students in their community to learn.
When the LOH curriculum was challenged, community members usually ended
up taking one side or another. LOH challengers and supporters both claimed that
the contention formed their opinion about what should be taught in the LOH
curriculum. Ashlee, an LOH supporter described the formation of opinion around
the LOH contention:
I just felt so - It was such a positive response, and truly it was in our best
interest because many more people found out about the incarceration [the
Japanese American internment] than would have ever known about it. I
mean it went much wider. I mean people would stop me in the grocery
store and say, 'oh [Ashlee], thank you so much. We’re so sorry what
you’re going through.’ I mean this continues to this day.
LOH challengers spoke in a similar way about the formation of public opinion
within the community. Referring to comments from community members, an
LOH challenger stated:
‘We like what you’re doing. Thank you for what you’re doing.’ Or, ‘We
think you’re absolutely right.’ And then you ask them if they would write
a letter to the school board or if they would come to a school board
meeting and protest or if they would write a letter to Hayashida, to the
principal and say, ‘You know, I think this curriculum is pretty bad.’ And
they say something like, ‘Oh, I can’t do that. I work for the school
district’… Or, ‘I have a business [in Telford].’
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In the process of these encounters, community members began to strengthen their
opinions about the LOH curriculum. However, the non-dominant viewpoints of
challengers were never fully engaged. Returning to the above critique of
Gutmann’s (1987) model, the power relations were concealed by a decisionmaking process that denied the validity of challenger claims concerning the public
interest. The vast increase of public support for racial profiling post-September
11th is one indication that the claims of LOH challengers were not an anomaly.
The rise of Malkin’s (2004) book, entitled In defense of internment: The case for
"racial profiling" in World War II and the war on terror, to New York Times
Best Seller status indicates that support for racial profiling was not far from the
lips of many Americans.
LOH challengers believed that the public interest would be best served by
a more patriotic LOH curriculum—one that did not judge past and present
government actions too harshly. LOH supporters believed that the public interest
would be best served by an LOH curriculum that taught students to be on guard
for civil liberties abuses in times of national emergency. The result of these
different claims concerning the public interest was a year-long process of
curriculum contention that weighed the nondominant perspectives of LOH
challengers with the public interest as interpreted by the Telford School District
(TSD). During the process, LOH challengers were given numerous opportunities
to voice their opinions, but their main claim that the mass incarceration was done
out of military necessity was never fully considered in a public forum. This has
direct bearing upon the validity of the final LOH revision decisions as
representing the public interest.
Conclusion and Recommendations for Curriculum Deliberation
The Leaving Our Homes (LOH) curriculum controversy provides a
snapshot of a contentious curriculum decision-making process in one school
district. As caretakers of the public interest in a liberal democracy, the public
school in the LOH case was charged with weighing multiple perspectives from its
community concerning the design and implementation of curriculum.
Findings indicate that the school followed a civic republican rather than a
procedural model of democracy when facilitating the resolution of the curriculum
dispute. Rather than rely upon a process of inclusion during the curriculum
decision-making process, the school district adhered to a civic republican
orientation related to the wrongfulness of the internment. In the school district’s
view, it was in the public interest to teach students that in a democracy, we must
be vigilant against racial profiling and civil liberties abuses.
The LOH curriculum controversy brings to the surface core questions
involving Gutmann’s (1987) qualification of nonrepression and nondiscrimination
in the curriculum because, for example, the LOH contention occurred within the
context of historical and contemporary practices of racial, ethnic, and religious
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profiling. The idea that students could be presented with a balanced view
concerning the wrongfulness or the correctness of the Japanese American
internment was abhorrent to educators and most community members.
The school board president compared the request for a balanced
perspective on the internment to a request for a balanced perspective concerning
the issue of whether slavery was wrong. All educators who spoke publically, from
the district superintendent to teachers, shared the perspective that the internment
of Japanese Americans was clearly a mistake. According to Gutmann, the expert
opinions of these educators should be, in principle, enough to solve the
curriculum controversy behind closed doors. In other words, the school district
had an a priori belief that that the internment was wrong, and that there was little
need to listen to the opposing views of LOH challengers. This approach limited
the range of perspectives in the curriculum decision-making process.
The school’s alignment with the civic republican model contrasts with
Habermas’s focus upon the procedural validation of public interest claims, which
demands that a wide range of perspectives be included in public deliberation of
curriculum. This wide range of perspectives must also include the perspectives of
those with whom the dominant community believes are anti-democratic or wrong.
The school district in the LOH case held three public meetings where the
community could voice their opinions. Anyone who wished to speak publicly was
given the opportunity to do so. However, challengers told me in interviews that
they feared charges of racism and ostracism from the community. In addition to
the a priori stance of the school district, this sense of coercion limited equal
access to public deliberation at the school board meetings. In this manner, the
school’s claim to an interpretation of public interest in the curriculum design and
implementation was weakened.
The LOH case illustrates the complexity of curriculum decisions when
stakeholders make different claims about the public interest. This supports Pinar’s
(2004) description of curriculum as a “‘complicated conversation’ of participants”
(p. 19). In the LOH case, the controversy was a social drama fueled by historical
and contemporary complicated conversations about social justice, national
security, racial profiling, and civil liberties. The curriculum was a flashpoint for
these complicated conversations. Although the case of the Japanese American
internment has long been considered wrong by the United States government and
most historians, it was the school’s duty to consider alternate perspectives in
curriculum design and implementation. Not to do so diminished the validity of
curriculum decisions as being in the public interest, as well as the opportunity for
communities to construct, deconstruct, and maintain public opinion on curriculum
in the public interest.
In conclusion, I propose a synthesis of the procedural and civic republican
models. The cases illustrated in this essay shed light on ways that deliberation in
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schools could be conducted better. Public school curriculum deliberation should
involve procedures that guard against dominant perspectives crowding out nondominant perspectives. The end decision will gain the legitimacy of having all
that are subject to the decision be involved in the decision making process.
However, deliberation is not conducted within a vacuum. The social positions and
identities of stakeholders are tied to a long history of power relations.
Gutmann’s principles of non-discrimination and non-repression should be
synthesized with Habermas’s procedural model of deliberation. During the initial
phase of deliberation in the process described in Figures 1 and 2, community
members and experts should be encouraged to identify as many factors of
discrimination and repression that might influence the curriculum issue under
deliberation. While the LOH challengers thought that the school district was
discriminating against them, the claims of LOH challengers cannot be removed
from a long and violent history of racism in the U.S.
The very mention of the topic of racial profiling brings thoughts and
emotions of fear and repression to many within the deliberation process itself. The
degrees to which stakeholders are influenced by this are dependent upon their
social positioning and identity in society. While a White, middleclass, English
speaking, male might view the issue of racial profiling as an important issue of
either national security or social justice, he is not as subject to hierarchies of
discrimination within society as much as a woman of color. The experiences of
stakeholders related to identity and discrimination should foreshadow all
deliberations. For many Japanese Americans, the LOH challengers were opening
painful wounds from the past that had been healing for 60 years. Historical and
contemporary patterns of discrimination and repression should be at the forefront
of any curriculum deliberation.
Habermas’s procedural model should be combined with the concepts of
non-discrimination and non-repression to increase the range of perspectives
allowed in deliberation. School districts should encourage an examination of what
is considered as non-discrimination and non-repression as a starting point that is
open for interpretation. This could diminish the influences of a civic republican
model that is itself discriminatory and repressive.
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Author Notes
This figure is adapted from (Habermas, 1996a). The word ‘discourses’ in the
original has been replaced with the word ‘talk’ to avoid confusing Habermas’s use
of the word discourse with the use of the word ‘discourse’ in other parts of this
dissertation.
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